Category Archives: Uncategorized

H2020 TROPICO started

The new H2020 TROPICO project (TRansforming into OPen, Innovative, and Collaborative Governments) looks at collaboration in the public sector. The goal of the project is to examine how public administrations are transformed to enhance collaboration in policy design and service delivery, advancing the participation of public, private and societal actors. The project has a special focus on e-government and digital services. The project received 4.75 million Euro, and the University of Bergen (UiB) is the coordinator of the project. The other project partners are: Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (The Netherlands), Hertie School of Governance (Germany), Tallinna Tehnikaulikool (Estonia), Universidad de Zaragoza (Spain), Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium), University of Antwerp (Belgium), Roskilde University (Denmark), Kozep-Europai Egyetem (Hungary), Cardiff University (United Kingdom), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (France) and Universität Potsdam (Germany)

Preferences in public procurement

In this paper in IJPSM we study public preferences for public procurement practices. The paper looks into public support for cost-effectiveness, discriminatory procurement in favour of domestic suppliers and sustainable procurement, using opinion data from 27 countries. Read it here or here (pre-print). The paper is part of a special issue about public procurement as a policy tool.

Cutbacks as change management

The financial crisis forces public managers to implement cutbacks within their organization. In this new paper, to appear in PMR, Eduard Schmidt, Sandra Groenveld and I argue that adopting a change management perspective contributes to our understanding of cutback management by adding a focus on managerial behaviour regarding cutback-related organizational changes. Relying on change management literature, this paper develops a framework for the analysis of cutback management connecting the context, content, process, outcomes and leadership of cutback-related change.

Moving to KU Leuven

d3f4baac-37fa-410d-847b-4fd6d9ecba9aI will be moving to KU Leuven on Oct. 1st. After eight years in Rotterdam, I decided to move to KU Leuven, Belgium, which is also where I received my PhD in 2004. Leuven offered me a Research Professorship (BOF ZAP Onderzoeksprofessor), which is a special position paid for through a University fund, and which allows me to build up a research team in Leuven. My host in Leuven will be the Public Governance Institute/Instituut voor de Overheid. I will join a team of PA scholars and political scientists – Geert Bouckaert, Annie Hondeghem, Marleen Brans, Trui Steen, Steven Van Hecke, Bart Maddens, Joep Crompvoets, Bruno Broucker, and Frankie Schram. My research will continue to focus on interaction between citizens and public services, performance, trust, and socialisation of new civil sservants.

PAR symposium: An experimental approach to public administration

‘Generating Usable Knowledge through an Experimental Approach to Public Administration’ is the introduction to our symposium in PAR on experimental methods in public administration. It shows how using experimental methods generates not only research that is empirically credible, but also relates to the real world of public administration. The ten articles in the symposium subject classic public administration theories or hypotheses that have been generated in nonexperimental research to rigorous testing using experimental methods. The first group of articles consists of studies with citizens who interact with government. The second group consists of three studies with public officials. Read the full  intro here.

Who is blamed for public service failure after contracting? Experimental evidence

Theories of blame suggest that contracting out public service delivery reduces citizens’ blame of politicians for service failure. In this article in Public Administration Review, Oliver James, Sebastian Jilke, Carolyn Petersen and I use an online experiment with 1,000 citizen participants to estimate the effects of information cues summarizing service delivery arrangements on citizens’ blame of English local government politicians for poor street maintenance. Participants were randomized to one of four cues: no information about service delivery arrangements, politicians’ involvement in managing delivery, delegation to a unit inside government managing delivery, and delegation through a contract with a private firm managing delivery. The politicians managing delivery cue raises blame compared to citizens having no information. However, the contract with a private firm cue does not reduce blame compared to either no information or the politicians managing delivery cue. Instead, the delegation to a unit inside government cue reduces blame compared to politicians managing delivery, suggesting that delegation to public managers, not contracting, reduces blame in this context. Early view here.

How Cutbacks and Job Satisfaction Are Related

Many studies on cutback management have suggested that cutbacks may have negative consequences for employee well-being in the public sector. However, the relationship between cutbacks and the work-related attitudes of top-level managers has received little attention. In this study, Joris van der Voet and assess the relationships between five commonly used cutback measures and the job satisfaction of top-level public managers in 12 European countries, using data from the COCOPS Top Public Executive Survey. We propose and test a model in which autonomy serves as an explanatory variable for the relationship between cutbacks and job satisfaction. The results indicate that cutback measures have little direct effect on the job satisfaction of managers. However, as cutback measures are related negatively to the perceived managerial autonomy of public managers and positively to the degree in which politicians interfere in the affairs of managers, autonomy may function as a mechanism to explain decreased job satisfaction as a result of cutback implementation. Full article here.